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confidentiality and access
confidentiality of statistical agency data
•“… when the secretary of [Commerce and Labor] 
directed that the census schedules of 
manufacturing establishments should be open to 
the inspection of officials belonging to another 
bureau within the same department […] and the 
director [of the Census Bureau] refused [….] 
because of the pledge of secrecy…”
(Walter Wilcox, 1914)
rich new analysis and publications
held back by concerns of citizens 
and businesses about privacy
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Src: Kraus (2011) https://www.census.gov/history/pdf/kraus-natdatacenter.pdf
1959-
1965
driven by advances in technology…
“These improvements resulted not only in time and space 
savings, but cost savings as well, enabling researchers to do 
more detailed research and respond more quickly to 
pressing social issues. […] government programs 
designed to address social issues […] called for more 
information and data on those issues. […] As research 
needs grew and research capabilities expanded,  […] 
increasing the demand for data.” 
Src: Kraus (2011) https://www.census.gov/history/pdf/kraus-natdatacenter.pdf
1960s!
professional associations
• At the 1959 annual meeting of the American Economic 
Association, members of the executive committee discussed the 
need for access to social and economic data for research purposes
→ Ruggles Report in April 1965 
• American Statistical Association (ASA) Advisory Committee 
assisted Bureau of the Budget (pre-OMB) 
→ “Recommendations on Availability of Federal Statistical Materials 
to Nongovernmental Research Workers,” The American Statistician, vol. 13, no. 4 (October 
1959) DOI: 10.1080/00031305.1959.10482600
driven by advances in technology
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driven by advances in technology
researchers knocking on the door
researcher access and privacy concerns
• 1960s in the US: proposal for “National Data Bank” with the goal of 
combining survey and administrative data to make available to 
researchers
• Instead, and partially as a consequence, privacy laws were formalized in the 
1970s (“Privacy Act 1974” (Public Law 93-579, 5 U.S.C. § 552a)) specifically 
prohibited “matching” programs, linking data from different agencies. 
• More recently: 2016 Australian Census elicited substantial 
controversy 
• Identifiable data with explicit goal of enabling linkages between the census 
and administrative data, as well as linkages across historical censuses
my talk today
focus
I will focus on access 
mechanisms for 
researchers
I will exclude
• Newer mechanisms to create 
tabular data (synthetic data, 
differentially-private data)
I will include
• Use of analytically-valid synthetic 
data as a access mechanism
Source:  (Fox News/REUTERS/Kacper Pempel/Files/https://goo.gl/ZHMkog)
context of my talk today
• Focus on researcher access to authorized data collections
• Not building new data collections, or enacting new laws
• Focus on the mechanisms for providing access
• Mostly physical
• Access to microdata
• Highlight the roles of “community”
• Training
• Legal framework
• Role of institutions
some geographic limitation
history again
really brief history in the US
• Starting in the 1960s and 70s, increased use of public-use microdata 
samples and surveys
• Researcher access at Census Bureau headquarters in the 1970s
• 1990: [Computing power: 3.5 MFLOPS for $9000]
• First RDC at Boston in the 1994
• A small number of RDCs in the 1990s
• Thin clients in the 2000s
• 2016: 24 RDCs
other countries: Germany
• Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Germany
• Commission to improve the informational infrastructure between the 
scientific community and official statistics
recommended creation of RDCs by producers of microdata (2001)
• RDC created in 2004 for “weakly anonymous” data
• Scientific use files (factually anonymous data) available under licensing 
agreements to university data enclaves
• 2011 RDC created at University of Michigan (with NSF funding)
1985 today1902 1942 1960
2001 2004 2011 15 RDCs in 
3 countries
(KVI)
other countries: France
• Centre d’accès securisé distant (CASD, France)
• Note: within same agency that enabled AKM (1999)
• INSEE recommended implementing a secure center for accessing data (2007)
• 2008 modification to Statistics Law made possible pilot infracstructure
• Pilot infrastructure becomes permanent in 2009 
• Expansion with per-project cost (invoicing) in 2012
today
2007
1985 2008
2009
2012
Source: presentation to the CASD Scientific Committee in 2013
Loi Informatique et Libertés (1978)
1995
1st working group 371 APs in 
8 countries
1990
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newer methods: Data Enclaves 
• custom tabulations (by staff) became too onerous
• tabulation and analysis work offloaded onto researchers by providing 
them with access to protected microdata
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microdata
Tabulations
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manual disclosure avoidance (DA)
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microdata)
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environment, with manual DA
Privacy   loss
Secondary secure PC giving a view 
onto secure data environment, 
with manual DA
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What type of access device?
basic paradigm
that spaceship thing…
• Pre-fabricated secure room
• First one installed in 2015 at 
University of St. Andrews 
(Scotland/UK)
• 2.3m x 1.8m
• Electronic locking, biometric 
recognition, CCTV, “Smart Glass”
• £ 25,000 ~ $30,000 incl. 
installation
• Part of UK ADRN
[For now: EU]
(7’6” x 5’10”)
Source: http://libanswers.st-andrews.ac.uk/faq/93548
thin clients
• With the notable exception of the Canadian RDCs (for now), thin 
clients are the preferred method of access
• Surrounded by walls = RDC [FSRDC in US, Germany, others]
• Embedded in a managed device = “thin client” [above, plus France]
• Software with a managed access token = “remote desktop” or “VDI” [some US 
agencies; DK, Finland]
• Additional controls may be
• IP address control [many]
• Biometric authentication [France]
• Smart card [France, US]
70.48.127.42
that box thing
• Custom remote access device 
used at CASD
• Encrypted storage, biometric 
smartcard reader, pre-configured 
VPN
• €35.00 / month, first user free, 
additional users €37.00 - €20.00 
/ month (decreasing)
scalability (CASD)
… added in 2016 alone
• 71 access points
• 232 users
• 62 projects
Totals
• 371 access points
• 1402 users
• 472 projects
lessons to be learned?
The very first RDCs were in North America 
(USA and Canada)
European systems came later
But can they provide new insights for 
our systems?
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Access matrix for remote submission
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The ultimate remote submission
Co-author with an employee of stats agency…
remote access setup
• Some setup required
• IAB’s JoSuA starts with a regular “on-site” access
• NCHS has a regular proposal process, billing is involved
• StatCan’s RTRA has a proposal process, review, etc.
• Testing in order to process remotely
• Dummy or test files (IAB)
• “Synthetic” files (StatCan)
• Pre-defined data dictionaries (NCHS)
synthetic data and remote submission
• StatCan: “synthetic” data = univariate draws, no analytic validity
• IAB also creates these types of files, but calls them “test” files
• Census Bureau: “synthetic data” = analytically valid, conditional on 
congeniality of the model
• Model is “verbally” described, but not formally
synthetic data: verification model
• Under development (Reiter, Machanavajjhala)
• Applied to OPM data
• Researcher develops model on synthetic data
• Assessment through submission of programs for “verification”
• Researcher obtains (DP) indication of proximity to actual results
• Restrictions on possible models (?)
• Under development
• Come back in April for NCRN workshop
synthetic data: validation model
• Used for SIPP Synthetic Beta, Synthetic LBD
• Researcher develops model on synthetic data
• Assessment through submission of programs for “validation”
• Researcher obtains actual results from model run on confidential data, 
subject to traditional disclosure avoidance rules
• No restrictions on types of models
• In progress since 2011
• Approx. 200 users
• Approx. 6-8% of users request validation
• Some unknown fraction “self-validate” through full FSRDC project 
some results from Synthetic Data Server
validation
• About 6-8% request validation
• Metric: confidence interval overlap Jk (Karr et al, 2006)
some results: SynLBD
an illustrative example (Bertrand et al, 2015)
some results: SSB
synthetic data takeaways
• Allow for modelling on the level of public-use data
• More sophisticated than the usual remote submission system
• Allow for faster validation on  confidential data
• Faster than RDC proposal process
• Is limited in terms of analytic validity
• But that may not be a bad thing
• Can accelerate disclosure avoidance process
• All tables that are to be released can be created beforehand
• In theory…
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trust and access
trust and access
• Frequent discussion
• Security measures are for (malevolent) intruders/opponents
• Researchers are trusted collaborators…
• … who know what they are doing
• A corollary:
• Protect against the bad guys
• But let the “good” guys do their thing
• Examples:
• Network-moderated access
• Contracts with disclosure avoidance rules
How do you 
know who the 
good guys are?
Also known as the 
“old boys’ network”
theory: culture
• Laws set the ground rules
• The way penalties and contracts are set up are important
• Researchers and agencies create the communities in which these 
rules are applied and enforced
• Training and “indoctrination”
• Common forums
• More or less tight binding of researchers into the community
penalties
penalties
• FSRDC and federal employee:
• federal prison sentence of up to five (5) years, a fine of up to $250,000, 
or both.
• France:
• prison sentence of up to one (1) year, a fine of up to €15,000, or both.
• IAB:
• Loss of data access for up to two (2) years for researcher and institution
• Contractual penalty up to €60,000 paid by the institution
penalties
• Denmark:
• Researcher: Loss of data access for life, or up to three (3) years for 
“minor breaches”
• Institution: Loss of access for a positive but limited (undefined) period
• No financial or penal penalties
Of Note: the FSRDC contract explicitly excludes a 
responsibility of the university for the actions of 
its employees.
penalties
Note:
No system admits to ever having had to enforce the rules.
(rumors and videos notwithstanding)
(this slide was added after the presentation was given on Feb 9, 2017)
During my presentation, Simson Garfinkel (now Census Bureau) noted that Federal Wide Assurances (FWA) 
backstop the presence of FSRDCs on campuses, and that FWA have been withdrawn in the past. 
I argued that the link between the FWA and the actual disclosure avoidance issues in the FSRDCs is tenuous, and 
not emphasized by universities at all (in my experience). I would put it into the same bin of “it’s a REALLY big stick, 
und unlikely to be wielded for minor infractions.” I also believe (my opinion) that the explicit exclusion of university 
responsibility in the FSRDC contract is meant to avoid the linkage between disclosure avoidance failures and the 
FWA.
I have heard that universities have been hesitant to sign the (more lenient, from a researcher perspective) German 
IAB RDC contract. This might be related to the more explicit link those contracts establish between university 
responsibility and researcher misconduct. But that is speculative.
training
hidden element: how is Disclosure Avoidance done?
• Most access methods:
• Enforcing minimum count of entities in a statistic (coefficient, mean, stddev)
• Prohibiting creation of tabular data (or making it very expensive)
• (Vain) attempt at tracking overlapping releases
• Automated systems
• Tracking of cells, implementation of (randomized) rounding, suppression, (output) 
noise infusion (StatCan, ABS)
• Similar in CB’s Microdata Analysis System/Automated Query System
• Newer mechanisms
• Noise infusion upon computation
• Differentially-private output perturbation (of model-based statistics, incl. coefficients 
and expected counts)
hidden cost: how to train the users?
• Programming
• DP-safe programming is hard for computer scientists → lost cause with social 
scientists until incorporated into SAS, Stata, etc.
• Tools
• Mostly lacking (in all of the environments that I have experienced)
• Concept
• Researchers have a hard time understanding confidentiality constraints
• Researchers have a hard time accepting confidentiality constraints
results from a survey of FSRDC users
• Survey run in October 2015, 145 respondents
FSRDC user experience: DA protocols
• 39% no prior experience
• 30% some experience
• 31% quite familiar
FSRDC user experience training
• 14% disagree or strongly disagree
• 73% agree or strongly agree
• 13% do neither
results from a survey of FSRDC users
• Disclosure avoidance:
• Users (NCHS) complained that “Disclosure avoidance personnel declined to 
approve output because they were not familiar with the software” despite 
pre-approval of generic output. 
• Other users grudgingly acknowledged that they “cannot avoid disclosure 
review” (on a NCHS project).
training content, method, and frequency
Frequency Access rules? Disclosure 
rules?
Disclosure 
avoidance 
tools?
Method
FSRDC yearly Initial As needed No Online
IAB RDC Initial Initial Yes No PDF 
(Contract, other)
CASD (France) Initial Initial Yes No In person (3h)
Denmark Initial Yes No No PDF
(Contract)
Responsible Conduct of Research (RCR)
• Course Introduction
• Research Misconduct 
• Research Involving Human Subjects 
• Plagiarism 
• Authorship 
• Collaborative Research 
• Conflicts of Interest 
• Data Management 
• Mentoring 
• Peer Review 
Approximately
3
hours
Note:
No discussion of practical 
disclosure avoidance, etc.
French training
• One-time initial training
• 3 (three) hours on-site classroom training
• Travel to Paris required
• First slide: legal penalties
• Quarter of slides: disclosure rules
• Mostly cell-count rules
• Mostly (numeric) examples of primary/secondary suppression
• Examples of what confidential supplementary files should look like
• Half of slides: technical system with live demo
CASD setup
• Source: CASD training materials 2017-01-12
CASD setup
• Source: CASD training materials 2017-01-12
CASD security
• Four-factor authentication
• Device 
• Card
• Fingerprint
• Password
• Loss of card (+fingerprint data) 
→ trip back to Paris to create a new one
conferences
community
• Census Bureau
• CES seminars featuring FSRDC presenters
• CES graduate mentorship
• FSRDC conference
• CASD
• Initial training plays a role
• So far, only one conference, but very high-profile
• Piketty video [URL]
• Minister of State for Digital Affairs Axelle Lemaire
community (cont.)
• IAB
• (past) visits to Nürnberg suggested and funded to connect with researchers
• So far, one international conference (at Michigan, organized by Maggie 
Levenstein)
• Overseas RDCs are a community-building exercise
• Flooding the job market with economics graduates who have worked with 
German data…
training content, method, and frequency
Frequency Access rules? Disclosure 
rules?
Disclosure 
avoidance 
tools?
Method
FSRDC yearly General 
(+ site specific)
General No Online
IAB RDC Initial No Yes No PDF 
(Contract, other)
CASD (France) Initial Yes Yes No In person (3h)
Denmark Initial Yes No No PDF
(Contract)
Method
FSRDC yearly General 
(+ site specific)
General Online
IAB RDC Initial No Yes PDF 
(Contract, other)
CASD (France) Initial Yes Yes In person (3h)
Denmark Initial Yes No PDF
(Contract)
User conference
Yearly
Irregular
2016
?
summary
summary
• Remote access of some type is the standard practice around the 
world
• Access locations and ease of releasing results vary substantially
• Disclosure avoidance process is still quite pedestrian in almost all 
cases, and DA methods are “old-fashioned”
• Remote submission methods remain quite limiting
• Newer access mechanisms (synthetic data) successfully combine 
ability to estimate arbitrary models with robust (provable) 
protection mechanisms, but remain at an early stage
access and trust
• Legal obligations matter
• Criminal vs. contractual obligations
• Obligating the institutions more strongly may help relax other constraints
• Community matters
• Pulling researchers close to the statistical agency through training
• Creating a community through conferences, mentoring, etc.
the ultimate achievement
What kind of community, training, legal 
environment would the FedStat system need to 
implement to allow researches to access 
confidential data the same way Census 
employees do?
thank you
lars.vilhuber@cornell.edu
p.s. one last thing
• Replicability is a nascent problem
• More and more journals require provable replicability
• Cannot be satisfied with idiosyncratic access 
mechanisms
• Some research with confidential files will lose
(reputable) publication outlets
• Transparency critical
• Need capability to be able to archive
research files within secure enclaves
• Need ability to publically identify such files 
(documentation) [DDI, DOI]
thank you
lars.vilhuber@cornell.edu
Thanks
• Stefan Bender (formerly IAB and now Bundesbank, Germany)
• Jörg Heining (IAB, Germany)
• Roxanne Silberman (CASD, France)
• Kamel Gadouche (CASD, France)
• Jean Poirier (CIQSS, Canada)
Some References
• Walter Wilcox (1914) cited in Anderson, Margo J., and Seltzer, William. “Federal Statistical Confidentiality 
and Business Data: Twentieth Century Challenges and Continuing Issues’.” Journal of Privacy and 
Confidentiality 1.1 (2009): 7-52, 55-58.
• Kohlmann, Annette (2005): “The Research Data Centre of the Federal Employment Service in the Institute 
for Employment Research.” In: Schmollers Jahrbuch 125, 437-447
• Allmendinger, Jutta and Kohlmann, Annette (2005) “Datenverfügbarkeit und Datenzugang am 
Forschungsdatenzentrum der Bundesagentur für Arbeit im Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung”. 
In: Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv 89, S. 159-182
• Heining, Jörg (2010): “The Research Data Centre of the German Federal Employment Agency: data supply 
and demand between 2004 and 2009.” In: Zeitschrift für ArbeitsmarktForschung, Jg. 42, H. 4, S. 337-350. 
http://www.iab.de/389/section.aspx/Publikation/k100128n09
• Kargus, Andrea; Müller, Anne (2014): “Auch in Nürnberg möglich: Von der zweiten Liga in die Champions 
League - ein Gespräch mit Stefan Bender.” In: IAB-Forum, Nr. 2, S. 38-45. 
http://www.iab.de/188/section.aspx/Publikation/k141201301
• Kraus, Rebecca S. (2011): “Statistical Déjà Vu: The National Data Center Proposal of 1965 and Its 
Descendants.” Presentation at JSM 2011. https://www.census.gov/history/pdf/kraus-natdatacenter.pdf
